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The under-development of existing annuity markets coupled with the secular trend away from
traditional pensions towards deﬁned contribution accounts in the U.S. raises signiﬁcant con-
cerns about the adequacy of retirement income for future retirees. We develop dynamic pro-
gramming techniques to evaluate the eﬃcacy of policies designed to address this concern by
encouraging annuitization. Our analysis suggests that policies providing monetary incentives
through the tax code can indeed signiﬁcantly enhance annuitization among retirees : our central
estimates suggest that tax-exemption based policies which have been recently proposed in
Congress have the potential to increase annuitization by as much as $50,000 for each retired
household, at a relatively modest revenue cost to the government. Similar sized policies based
instead on refundable tax credits may be more desirable from both eﬃciency and distributional
perspectives.
1 Introduction
As the baby boom starts to retire, the question of the adequacy of retirement income
is growing more important. In addition to demographic trends, concerns over the
future of Social Security and the downward trend in traditional deﬁned beneﬁt pen-
sion provision have brought more attention to the importance of private saving for
funding retirement income. The adequacy of retirement resources depends not only
on how much wealth a household accumulates, but also on decisions on how to
allocate and spend this wealth after retirement. Uncertainty about the length of life
is crucial in decision making about allocating and spending down wealth. Annuities
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can provide an important form of insurance in dealing with this uncertainty, but,
unfortunately, economic research has indicated that individuals appear to under-
utilize private annuities.
Much of the public policy toward retirement savings has used the tax code to
encourage savings without encouraging retirees to use this savings to purchase
annuities. New proposals, however, have introduced targeted incentives to increase
annuitization (see, for example, the Lifetime Pension Annuity for You Act of 2007).
Our goal is to provide a prognosis for success from two types of such initiatives : (1) a
partial exemption of annuity income from taxable income; and (2) a refundable tax
credit based on the amount of annuity income received.
We evaluate the responsiveness of annuitization decisions to subsidies using
dynamic programming techniques, which have been widely employed in studying
annuity markets. We ﬁnd that targeted incentives are likely to substantially increase
private annuitization with a baseline estimated increase in annuitization on the order
of $50,000 on average for retired couples, though subject to considerable uncertainty.
Our results also indicate that this increase will occur at relatively modest cost to the
government in terms of forgone tax revenues, with estimates of the steady-state
revenue costs of less than 10–15 cents per dollar of additional annuitization over the
entire life of each retired cohort. One diﬀerence in the policies is that the beneﬁts of
exempting annuity income from taxation are skewed towards relatively well-to-do
retirees whereas the refundable tax credit induces annuitization across a broader
cross section of retired households.
We emphasize that our results should be interpreted with some caution since the
dynamic programming techniques underlying our estimates are the same techniques
that motivate the so-called ‘‘annuity puzzle : ’’ the models over-predict how much
households annuitize. However, our focus on changes in – rather than levels of –
annuitization partially assuages concerns about the techniques, and we explicitly oﬀer
some plausible conditions under which this approach is valid.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section brieﬂy reviews existing research
on the annuity puzzle. The third section discusses issues of policy design for in-
creasing annuitizaton. The fourth and ﬁfth sections analyze two particular policy
proposals, one based on tax exemptions and modeled on recently proposed legis-
lation, and one based on a refundable tax credit. In the fourth section, we present
Money’s Worth estimates based on market prices, and we compute the eﬀect of the
two policies on these Money’s Worths. The ﬁfth section incorporates this pricing
information into an ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’ dynamic programming model
with an extensive annuitization margin to assess the policies’ potential eﬃcacy. The
ﬁnal section summarizes the policy implications of our analysis and broadly considers
other possible approaches to increasing annuitization.
2 A Brief Review of Research on the Annuity Puzzle
A brief review of previous research on annuity markets and the annuity puzzle pro-
vides context for our analysis. The ‘‘annuity puzzle ’’ is the observation that house-
holds appear to annuitize far less wealth than economic analysis suggests they should.
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Yaari (1965) showed that full annuitization is optimal in the absence of loading
or bequest motives. His theoretical contributions have been extended by Davidoﬀ
et al. (2005), who show that optimizing individuals should make extensive use of
annuity markets under quite general conditions.
In practice, however, private annuity markets are quite thin. Using wealth data
from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS),1 as of 2000, Poterba et al. (2003)
report extremely low levels of (privately) annuitized wealth. For example, the median
male between the ages of 63 and 67 has no privately annuitized wealth. Johnson et al.
(2004) use panel features of the HRS and ﬁnd that, among individuals with deﬁned
contribution (DC) retirement plans who left their job after age 65, only 10% actually
converted their DC accumulations into annuities.
Insurance industry data corroborates the thinness of annuity markets. From
American Council of Life Insurance data, Brown (2000) reports that less than 4% of
individuals with Social Security income also receive private annuity income. Data on
deferred annuity sales are also available (see, e.g., NAVA (2005)), but Reichenstein
(2002) reports that 98% of individuals who purchase deferred annuities do not con-
vert them into life annuities. Furthermore, the market for immediate annuities is
quite thin, with sales of only $5.9 billion in 2006 (LIMRA, 2007), a ﬁgure which
includes both life annuities and period certain annuities.
James and Vittas (2004) note that thin private annuity markets are an international
phenomenon by examining markets in Canada, Australia, Israel, and Singapore, for
example. Interestingly, Chile and the United Kingdom, both of which have pension
systems with mandatory annuitization of some forms of savings, have more sub-
stantial annuity markets (see Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004, on the thinness of the
‘‘voluntary’’ U.K. market).
Mitchell et al. show that unfavorable pricing alone cannot resolve the annuity
puzzle. They calculate ‘‘Money’s Worths’’ (MWs) – the ratio of the premium to the
expected value based on expected mortality and interest rates – and ﬁnd loads of
about 15–20 cents for the average retiree in U.S. annuity market ; they attribute
about half of the load to adverse-selection. They then use dynamic programming
techniques – akin to the ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’ technique we use – to ﬁnd the
utility value of annuitization for retirees. They ﬁnd annuitization values high enough
that individuals should readily purchase annuities, despite this less-than-fair pricing.
Other suggested solutions to the annuity puzzle include the existence of pre-
annuitized wealth such as Social Security wealth (Mitchell et al. 1999) ; within-
household risk pooling for married couples (Brown and Poterba, 2000) ; and bequest
motives (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990).2 Even accounting for within-household
risk sharing and observed levels of pre-annuitized wealth, dynamic optimization
1 The HRS tracks the 1931–1941 birth cohort in the U.S. It started in 1992 with biannual follow-up
interviews.
2 Milevsky (1998) argues that higher rates of return in equity markets vis-a-vis annuities may help resolve
the puzzle as well ; this argument is less plausible in light of ‘‘variable’’ annuities which have payments
linked to the equity returns (and retain the mortality return-premium associated with annuities).
Recently, Turra and Mitchell (2004) and Sinclair and Smetters (2004) have explored the possibility that
other risks – in particular the risk of liquidity needs for medical expenditures – can make annuitization
less desirable.
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techniques indicate that substantial annuitization should be optimal. Strong enough
bequest motives can certainly resolve the puzzle. However, the empirical evidence is
decidedly mixed as to the relationship between bequest motives and annuitization
decisions: Brown (2001) does not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the stated
desire to leave bequests and the stated intention to annuitize DC plan assets upon
retirement; and Johnson et al. (2004) note that childless adults are no more likely to
annuitize assets from DC balances.
Dushi and Webb (2004) extend the ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’ (AEW) tech-
niques used in the literature so that households choose when, how much, and how
many times to annuitize, as opposed to earlier literature which largely focused on a
one-time decision about whether to annuitize all wealth. This added ﬂexibility can
substantially delay annuitization to ages beyond those in the HRS. But, while delay
may explain the paucity of annuitization in the HRS, it cannot explain the broader
pattern of underdeveloped annuity markets.
The annuity puzzle recommends caution in employing the AEW framework for
policy analysis. The divergence between predicted and actual annuitization patterns
suggests that the AEW framework neglects some important aspect of the annuitiz-
ation decision. Nevertheless, the AEW framework is useful for our purposes for
at least two reasons. First, despite the annuity puzzle, Brown (2001) shows that the
AEW framework does predict households’ intentions to annuitize. Using the HRS
data for 1992, he estimates that a 1% increase in AEW leads to nearly a 1% increase
in the stated intention to annuitize. Second, while the optimization techniques
underlying AEW calculations are likely to mis-represent annuitization levels, they
may still be useful as guides for predicting changes in behavior. Appendix B oﬀers
some simple conditions under which our technique is valid despite overpredicting
annuitization levels.
3 The Analytics of Subsidizing Annuitization
The public policy challenge for ensuring retirement income adequacy needs to
address both the level of household saving and how households ﬁnance consumption
in retirement. Over the past few decades, government policies such as the expansion
of 401(k) plans have provided incentives for retirement savings but have not em-
phasized the importance of using life annuity markets. Indeed, the trend toward
deﬁned contribution pension plans away from deﬁned beneﬁt pensions will reduce
households’ annuitized wealth unless households annuitize their deﬁned contribution
assets. Recently, policy-makers have proposed tax incentives to encourage annuitiz-
ation. In the remainder of this section, we ﬁrst discuss the current income taxation of
annuities and then address general issues in designing public policy to encourage
annuitization. We apply our analysis to speciﬁc policy proposals in Sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Taxation of Annuities
A major tax distinction for annuity contracts is between ‘‘qualiﬁed’’ and ‘‘non-
qualiﬁed’’ purchases. Qualiﬁed refers to an annuity purchased within a tax-
advantaged savings vehicle, such as a 401(k) or Individual Retirement Account
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(IRA). For such annuities, the entire payment from the annuity is taxable since all
withdrawals from such accounts are fully taxable. In contrast, for Roth-styled
(or after-tax) IRAs, the entire annuity payment is exempt from tax. Non-qualiﬁed
annuities refer to annuity contracts purchased with after-tax dollars. The amount of
money contributed to the annuity establishes the taxpayer’s basis (or principal) in
the annuity. During the accumulation phase of a non-qualiﬁed deferred annuity, the
investment returns on the contribution to the annuity are not taxed. Instead, the
taxation on the ‘‘ inside buildup’’ in the annuity is tax-deferred. For both deferred
and immediate annuities, a portion of the payment from the annuity is the return of
basis to the taxpayer and is not subject to income taxation.3 This portion depends
on the annuitant’s life expectancy when the assets are annuitized and the type of
payments that will be received from the annuity (e.g., ﬁxed versus variable payments).
The remainder of the annuity payment faces ordinary income tax rates, even when the
underlying assets held by the insurance company yield capital gains or dividends that
would have faced lower marginal tax rates had the annuitant invested in these assets
directly.
3.2 Rationales for Policy Intervention
One rationale for government intervention in annuity markets is to ameliorate ad-
verse selection loads caused by informational asymmetries. A second rationale is
moral hazard: since the government eﬀectively provides some degree of assistance for
individuals who outlive their resources, individuals may tend to annuitize too little
private wealth, so that the rest of society bears part of the cost of the individual’s
good fortune to live a long life. By encouraging annuitization, the government may
reduce these social costs.
A third rationale is paternalistic : many people may naturally underestimate
their need for insurance. Public policy can have two beneﬁcial eﬀects in this re-
gard. First, by lowering the price of annuities, people might become more likely to
purchase them. Second, the government policy may play an informational role in
signaling to people that private annuities are a useful ﬁnancial product. While our
estimates below focus on the ﬁrst of these eﬀects, the informational role of public
policy is potentially important, though the eﬀects are hard to quantify. For non-
qualiﬁed annuities, there is a fourth rationale for subsidizing annuity purchases : it can
help to oﬀset the disparity between the tax treatment of capital-gains and dividend
income and the tax treatment of annuity income generated by the same underlying
assets.
We focus solely on interventions which encourage people to annuitize wealth,
so these policy rationales are best thought of as applying to interventions in the
immediate annuity market (or, for deferred annuities, the choice of how to with-
draw assets). As pointed out by Reichenstein (2002), deferred annuities are not
terribly attractive investments for the vast majority of households. Furthermore,
3 Since the inside buildup of a deferred annuity is tax deferred, the basis component of a deferred annuity is
smaller than the basis component of an immediate annuity. Hence, for an equal amount of annuitized
wealth, a deferred annuity generates more taxable income than an immediate annuity generates.
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deferred annuities are used mainly as savings vehicles instead of commitments to
annuitize ; as pointed out above, very few deferred annuities are converted into life
annuities.
3.3 Issues in Policy Design
In designing policies to increase annuitization, three issues are critical. A well-
designed policy will : (1) create an incentive for individuals and couples to demand
more annuitization; (2) target groups within the overall population whose lack of
annuitization makes them most vulnerability to risks of outliving their resources ; and
(3) be cost eﬀective in terms of its consequences for the government budget. We
consider each in turn.
3.3.1 Incentives
Subsidizing the purchase of private annuities – broadly interpreted to include, e.g.,
tax exemptions, matching grants at the time of annuitization, and other annuity
income subsidies – would potentially increase the demand for annuities directly.
A suﬃciently large or well targeted shift in demand could magnify the eﬃcacy of the
subsidy: private market annuity prices could fall as the expanding pool of annuitants
mitigates adverse selection, thereby making the pool even deeper and further lower-
ing prices. We dub this eﬀect a ‘‘ life-spiral ’’ since it is the opposite of the adverse
selection ‘‘death spirals ’’ discussed in the literature on other insurance markets (e.g.,
Cutler and Reber, 1998). This suggests that subsidies targeted at people who do
not buy annuities due to personal characteristics correlated with low life expectancies
can be particularly eﬀective at encouraging annuitization.
Governments typically have no informational advantage over private insurers
in identifying risk-related characteristics and furthermore face political constraints
in designing incentives targeted at individuals with particular characteristics. This
suggests that there is limited scope for governments to take advantage of these sorts
of targeted incentives. However, it is widely held that longevity and wealth – and
hence longevity and marginal tax rates – are positively associated (Attanasio and
Hoynes, 2000; Smith and Kington (1997)). This recommends designing incentives
that are diﬀerentially targeted towards low marginal tax rate retirees.
The timing of the subsidy also plays an important role in combating adverse
selection. Under the natural assumption that asymmetric information regarding
relative longevity increases with age, adverse selection loads are likely to be more
severe at older ages, a pattern consistent with evidence we report in Section 4. Thus,
it may be desirable to employ an age-based subsidy that favors people who annuitize
or commit to annuitize at younger ages.4
While tying the subsidy to age or to a pre-commitment to annuitize are two ways
to reduce adverse selection, subsidies that are tied to the receipt of income from an
annuity may also favor annuitization earlier in life. For example, policies with caps
4 Shifting the timing of the annuitization decision does not necessarily imply that people start drawing on
annuities earlier in life. People could purchase forward contracts on annuities that commit them to
annuitizing at some age.
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on annual beneﬁts provide an incentive to annuitize at an earlier age for households
that would receive more annuity income than the upper threshold at which the policy
has a marginal eﬀect, since annuitizing earlier implies receiving lower periodic pay-
ments over a longer period of time, increasesing the amount of wealth aﬀected by the
subsidy. For non-qualiﬁed annuities, the reduced tax on annuity income eﬀectively
increases the after-tax rate of return on annuitized wealth and, by annuitizing earlier
in life, an investor can increase the time horizon over which the higher after-tax rate
of return is earned.
Holding ﬁxed the amount of wealth accumulated by a household, a subsidy for
annuitization creates an incentive to substitute annuitized wealth for unannuitized
wealth. There may also be an oﬀsetting income (or wealth) eﬀect, since the subsidy
reduces the amount of wealth that an investor must annuitize in order to receive a
given stream of annuity payments. For households who would not annuitize in the
absence of the subsidy – a substantial fraction of households given the thinness of
annuity markets – the income eﬀect is absent and a subsidy can only encourage
annuitization. On the other hand, the income eﬀect coupled with an imposition of
caps on the amount of annuitized income (or wealth) that are eligible for preferential
treatment can have perverse eﬀects on their incentives to encourage annuitization:
Households who would annuitize beyond the caps in the absence of the policy face
only the income eﬀect and are likely to reduce their annuitization levels in response
to the subsidy policy.
3.3.2 Targeting and Distributional Concerns
There are several rationales for targeting policies aimed at increasing annuitization at
speciﬁc portions of the population. First, as discussed above, targeted beneﬁts can
help to mitigate adverse selection loads in the annuity market. Second, one might
want to limit the beneﬁts of the proposals that ﬂow to wealthy households since these
households are unlikely to be vulnerable to the risk of outliving their assets, especially
if they intend to leave bequests or are already suﬃciently well annuitized to be pro-
tected against outliving their resources. Finally, general distributional concerns are
an important element of policy design.
To study the potential distributional consequences of providing annuitization
incentives, we consider the wealth distribution of households near the normal re-
tirement age. Table 3.1 replicates a table, based on the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS), from Dushi and Webb (2004). This table consolidates several waves of the
HRS to focus on couples for which the head of household is age 65. It provides
the wealth distribution by decile for this sample of couples broken down by type
of wealth. It excludes the top one percent of the wealth distribution.5
Several important patterns emerge from Table 3.1. First, wealth at retirement age
is unevenly distributed. The average wealth of the 9th decile is 3.5 times larger than
the average wealth of the 2nd decile. In part, this variance highlights the diﬀerences
across households in how prepared they are for ﬁnancing retirement. Second, Social
5 The data in the Table 3.1 are in 2000 dollars. Adjusting for inﬂation between 2000 and 2006 would
increase the values by roughly 20 percent.
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Table 3.1. Composition of HRS Households’ Balance Sheets at Age 65 – Couples
Total Wealth Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Non-Retirement Wealth 28,711 60,076 86,690 120,875 127,976 166,928 201,657 235,777 316,387 976,239
Financial Assets x243 7,708 7,297 14,290 11,821 13,118 23,413 25,108 50,399 204,085
Business Assets 973 2,458 7,297 14,290 11,821 13,118 23,413 25,108 50,399 204,085
Primary Residence Net
of Mortgage
25,983 46,386 63,678 77,399 87,335 115,327 109,670 142,139 157,521 244,241
Net Other Property 1,998 3,524 8,418 14,896 16,999 25,365 45,161 43,422 58,068 323,828
Retirement Wealth 155,181 251,928 318,283 366,261 430,027 484,342 545,404 600,499 774,237 1,051,688
Social Security 142,111 209,310 227,351 251,752 260,138 272,463 261,455 270,474 296,868 301,920
DB Pensions 10,203 28,943 75,548 77,523 129,641 160,455 187,735 205,334 303,128 394,919
DC Pensions 1,050 5,971 6,410 14,895 12,419 10,595 21,742 21,685 43,847 122,548
IRAs 1,817 7,704 8,974 22,091 27,829 40,829 74,472 103,006 130,394 232,301
Total Wealth 183,892 312,004 404,973 487,136 558,003 651,270 747,061 836,276 1,090,624 2,027,927
Annuitized Wealth as
% of Total Wealth
80 76 73 67 67 63 56 50 49 32
Total # of Obs. 180 158 158 144 140 139 128 126 131 114
with DB 44 78 118 96 120 117 103 101 107 74
without DB 136 80 40 48 20 22 25 25 24 40
Source : Dushi and Webb (2004).
Notes : Data from Health and Retirement Study, waves 2 to 5. Sample: married couples who turned 65 in any of the waves 2 to 5. Sample size – 1431
observations, from which 13 observations falling in the 100th wealth percentile were dropped resulting in a sample of 1418. We excluded the 100th
percentile from the 10th decile and the wealth upper cut-oﬀ point is $4,332,141. The present values of Social Security and employer Deﬁned Beneﬁt
pensions were calculated using a real rate of interest of 3% and an inﬂation rate of 2.5%. Annuitized wealth equals the sum of SS and DB pensions.























Security wealth plays an important role in the balance sheets of these households.
Even for the 5th decile, Social Security wealth is almost half (47 percent) of total
wealth. Third, deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions account for a substantial fraction of
the wealth of this cohort but DB pension wealth is quite unevenly distributed. The
combination of Social Security and DB pension wealth implies that many households
hold a considerable fraction of their wealth in annuitized forms. The fraction of
wealth held in annuitized forms decreases steadily from the bottom decile to the
top decile, mainly reﬂecting the declining importance of Social Security wealth rela-
tive to total wealth. Fourth, the amount of wealth in qualiﬁed accounts (IRA and DC
pensions) is relatively modest for this cohort. However, the data are somewhat dated
(based on 1992–2000) so these balances understate the importance of this wealth for
current and future cohorts of retirees.
In terms of targeting proposals to increase annuitization, the data in the
table suggest that the bottom three deciles of the wealth distribution have little
wealth that can be annuitized. Compounding this eﬀect is that much of these groups’
wealth outside of Social Security and DB pensions is held as housing equity. Given
the common hesitancy for people to move out of their houses and the thinness
of reverse mortgage markets, these groups have extremely limited assets available
to annuitize. Of course, the table presents averages for the deciles which mask the
heterogeneity within the deciles, so many households in these groups may have
portfolios that would allow them to beneﬁt from a policy that encourages annuitiz-
ation.
3.3.3 Cost Eﬀectiveness
The eﬀectiveness of policy proposals depends on the size of the incentives introduced
by the policies and how responsive household annuity decisions are to these in-
centives. The revenue cost to the government depends on several features of the
policy, most obviously the eﬀective rate of subsidy and the level at which these ben-
eﬁts are capped. Another key issue is that the treatment of annuities purchased before
enactment of the new legislation creates a classic transition concern. If the pre-
ferential treatment applies to annuity income from pre-existing annuities as well as
income from subsequent annuitization, the legislation will create windfall gains for
the owners of pre-enactment annuities and ‘‘windfall ’’ revenue losses to the govern-
ment. It would be cumbersome – and politically inexpedient – to write transition
rules to limit these losses. An alternative approach would be to provide a one-time
subsidy at the time of annuitization based on the wealth annuitized rather than an
annual subsidy based on annuity income. This would allow for similar annuitization
incentives but would circumvent cumbersome transition rules (and the political in-
expediency). It would, however, involve a substantial front-loading of government
revenue costs.
Finally, the level of annuitization that would obtain in the absence of the subsidy
policy is also a key input for determining the policy’s cost-eﬀectiveness, since sub-
sidization of income from annuities that would have been purchased anyway rep-
resents an unavoidable windfall cost.
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4 Policy Proposals and the Money’s Worth of Currently Available Annuities
The Money’s Worth (MW) of an annuity is a measure of how fairly that annuity is
priced for a given individual. Speciﬁcally, it is the ratio of the expected value of the
income stream provided by that annuity to the premium paid for it (see, e.g., Mitchell
et al., 1999 for details). To compute the Money’s Worth of life annuities, we use the
mortality tables for the 1920, ’30, ’40 and ’50 cohorts reported in U.S. Social Security
Administration’s Actuarial Study 120 (Bell and Miller, 2005). We make the plausible
assumption that the mortality probabilities of the two annuitants in a joint-
and-survivor contract are independent. For convenience, we focus on the couples
consisting of a male and a female, each born on the same day of the same year.
For annuity prices, we use quotes from Vanguard.6 They have an online interface
that gives instant price quotes for a variety of annuity products. We obtained quotes
for men, women and couples living in New York assuming a birthday of July 23rd
(since we obtained the data on July 23rd, 2006) for a $100,000 life annuity (without
any guaranteed payments) with annual payments starting one year later.7 We ob-
tained quotes for nominal and inﬂation-protected annuities. For joint and survivor
annuities, we assumed that the household would want a 2/3 beneﬁt for the surviving
spouse regardless of which spouse passes away ﬁrst.8 The price quotes we obtained
give the nominal size of the ﬁrst payment in the income stream. Table 4.1 summarizes
these quotes.
Table 4.1. Initial payment, per $100,000 premium
Age: 56 66 76 86
Gender Nominal Annuities
Male $7347.00 $9003.48 $12350.52 $19358.40
Female $6937.80 $8272.56 $11154.60 $18091.08
Joint and 2/3 Survivor $6885.97 $8160.92 $10796.41 $16705.24
Inﬂation Protected Annuities
Male $4881.48 $6556.32 $9836.88 $16695.24
Female $4487.64 $5881.56 $8742.48 $15504.48
Joint and 2/3 Survivor $4436.40 $5775.33 $8412.08 $14223.16
Source : Vanguard.com, 2006. See text for details.
6 https ://ﬂagship2.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/content/AccountServ/Retirement/ATSAnnuitiesOV
Content.jsp accessed July 23, 2006. Vanguard’s annuity prices are reasonably representative of average
market prices. The 16-company average prices reported by www.immediateannuities.com typically diﬀer
from them by less than 0.5%.
7 Vanguard quoted identical prices for almost all states (California was a notable exception) and NewYork
provided a representative quote. Vanguard’s pricing is linear for purchases above $20,000.
8 Vanguard’s joint and survivor annuities with 2/3 survivor beneﬁt are asymmetric with respect to the
primary and secondary annuitant, paying the full amount if the primary annuitant is alive and reducing
the payment only if the primary annuitant dies and the secondary annuitant continues to live. These seem
to be unnatural retirement products. We instead price a synthetic symmetric joint and 2/3 survivor
annuity we create by taking a weighted average of prices from Vanguard for single life annuities for each
gender and for joint and full survivor annuities.
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We used the term structure of nominal and inﬂation protected Treasury bonds as
of July 31st, 20069 to determine interest rates and inﬂation rates. We compute the
present value of annuity income streams using the after-tax real interest rate based on
this structure and for marginal tax rates mtr=0%, 15%, and 25%. These tax rates
also aﬀect the after-tax payments received by annuitants. For qualiﬁed annuities,
the entire annuity payment is subject to tax, and we take the after-tax payment to
be (1 – mtr) of the pre-tax payment. We treat the ‘‘cost ’’ of a qualiﬁed annuity as
(1 – mtr) times the premium paid, since the alternative to annuitizing qualiﬁed assets
is to withdraw them and subject them to taxation.
For non-qualiﬁed annuities, a portion of the annuity payment is excluded from
taxable income as a return of basis. We assume that individuals purchase single-
premium immediate non-qualiﬁed annuities using a lump sum of cash Y, which we
take to be the basis for the annuity purchase (i.e., the cost of the annuity). The tax
code recognizes Y/L of each annuity payment as the ‘‘return of basis ’’ for each of the
ﬁrst L years, where L is the statutory life expectancy (see IRS Publication 939). A 65
year old male purchasing a nominal life annuity with non-qualiﬁed assets would
be able to exclude nearly 60% of the payment from his annuity for approximately
15 years, for example.10
Table 4.2 reports MW’s for each of the age and gender groups from Table 4.1 for
each of the diﬀerent tax rates, and for both qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed sources
of funds. These MW’s indicate that annuity prices are signiﬁcantly worse than ac-
tuarially fair, with insurance loads on the order of 5–10 cents on the dollar for 56 year
olds, increasing to 30–35 cents on the dollar for 86 year olds for nominal annuities.
These loads are relatively consistent across households of a given age, with males
facing slightly higher loads. The age 66 loads are modestly lower than the loads
reported by Mitchell et al. (1999), and our results indicate a somewhat steeper in-
crease in loading with age. This sharp increase in loads with age is consistent across
products, genders, and tax rates ; it is strongly suggestive of an increase in adverse
selection loads with age. Consistent with international evidence from James and
Vittas (2004), the MWs for inﬂation protected annuities are uniformly lower than
MWs for nominal annuities, implying additional loads of about 6–10 percentage
points.11
We next use the MW framework to evaluate the potential eﬀectiveness of policy
interventions to enhance annuitization in the U.S. We evaluate the impact of
two policy proposals : the tax-exemption based Lifetime PAY bill, H.R. 4150,
9 J. Huston McCulloch makes this data publicly available at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jhm/ts/
ts.html#comp. We thank him for providing this public service. We note, however, that the interpolation
techniques he uses do lead to some oddities in the inferred term structure of real interest rates.
10 For inﬂation protected joint and survivor annuities with low survivor beneﬁts, Y/L actually exceeds the
total annuity payment in some payment periods. The tax code allows this extra basis to be rolled over
to future years. We simplify our calculations by counterfactually assuming tax ‘‘rebates. ’’ This only
modestly overstates the value of the annuity, diﬀering by less than 1% from our estimates if the extra
basis is instead simply forfeited.
11 The clear pattern of increases in MW with marginal tax rates within qualiﬁed accounts is an artifact of
our all-at-once treatment of the taxation of qualiﬁed wealth which is not annuitized. Using instead the
eﬀective tax rate that would be levied on phased withdrawals from a qualiﬁed account would substan-
tially mute this pattern.
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Table 4.2. Benchmark Money’s Worth Ratios by Gender, Age and Marginal Tax
Rates with No Policy Intervention




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95
66 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.89
76 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.82
86 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.64 0.72 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.70




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88
66 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.82
76 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.76
86 0.60 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.65




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.08
66 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.99
76 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.88
86 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.66 0.76 0.73 0.67 0.77 0.74




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.98
66 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.90
76 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.80
86 0.60 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.71 0.68
Source : Author’s calculations, as described in text. The calculations assume a premium of $100,000.
‘‘Couples’’ refers to a joint-and-survivor annuity for a couple with the same age and a symmetric 2/3
survivor beneﬁt.
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110th Congress12 and a refundable tax credit policy of comparable magnitude. We
model only the direct eﬀect of these policies on the after-tax payments from the
annuities in Table 4.1.
The Lifetime PAY bill
The Lifetime PAY bill provides for a tax exemption on 25% or 50% of annuity
income, depending on whether the funds used for the purchase are qualiﬁed or non-
qualiﬁed, up to a total of $5,000 in exempted income per person. For households with
a positive marginal tax rate, this policy reduces the eﬀective tax rate on annuity
income, raising the MW of an annuity by increasing its after-tax real income stream.
Table 4.3 reports the percentage increases in MWs (over the MWs reported in
Table 4.2) for $100,000 annuity policies.13 Table 4.3 clearly illustrates how the bill
most strongly encourages annuitization for annuitants in higher tax brackets (and
not at all for households with no tax liability). For non-qualiﬁed funds, Table 4.3
indicates that the Lifetime PAY bill has similar MW eﬀects across nominal and
inﬂation protected annuities and across types of households at a given tax rate. The
table also illustrates that the bill diﬀerentially improves the value of annuitization of
non-qualiﬁed assets at younger ages relative to at older ages, and it may therefore
encourage earlier annuitization.
The eﬀect of the Lifetime PAY bill on the MWs of qualiﬁed policies depends on the
tax rate but not on the household age or the type of annuity purchased. This is
because the $100,000 policy size is small enough to keep annuity income below the
limits of the policy, so all payments are subsidized equally. In the 15% tax bracket,
for example, each of the annuitant’s after tax payments is 4.41% higher – i.e.,
100%r{[1 – (.15) (1 – .25)] – (1 – .15))}/(1 – .15), where .15 is the eﬀective marginal
tax rate on annuity payments prior to the policy change and (.15) (1 – .25) is the
eﬀective marginal tax rate under the policy.
A Tax-Credit Based Policy
Policy proposals such as the Lifetime PAY bill attempt to encourage annuitization at
retirement by providing tax exemptions. In this, they parallel the tax advantages
provided by most policies designed to encourage retirement savings (e.g., 401(k)
accounts). Providing tax exemptions is a natural mechanism for encouraging savings,
since the decision to save is distorted by a marginal tax wedge, a distortion well
mitigated by an exemption. The case for using exemptions to encourage annuitization
is less compelling, since there are no intrinsic tax-rate-based economic distortions.
This motivates our decision to analyze a proposal in which the annuitization in-
centives provided are de-coupled from the marginal tax rate.
12 The Lifetime PAY Bill was introduced by Representative Earn Pomeroy in November, 2007. Similar
legislation was introduced in the Senate by Senator Gordon Smith and others in the Retirement Security
for Life Act of 2007.
13 By analyzing a $100,000 annuity, the incomes generated by the annuity are below the caps imposed by
the Lifetime PAY bill for annuitants of all ages. These caps are binding for larger policies, especially
when purchased at older ages. For a 66 year old couple facing a 25% tax rate, binding caps reduce the
increase in MWs from the Lifetime Pay bill to 5.13 and 3.61 percent, for $500,000 and $1 million non-
qualiﬁed policies, respectively.
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Under this policy proposal, the government would provide a 5% refundable tax
credit on income from qualiﬁed annuities and a 10% refundable tax credit on income
from non-qualiﬁed annuities, up to a maximum credit of $1,000 per year. These
parameters make the tax-credit-policy roughly comparable to the Lifetime PAY
proposal. For an individual facing a 20%marginal tax rate, the two policies coincide.
For households facing higher marginal tax rates, the Lifetime PAY bill is more
generous, and for households facing lower marginal tax rates, the tax-credit policy is
Table 4.3. Percent Change in Money’s Worth Ratios Under Lifetime PAY Bill
($100K Premium)




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0 0 0 3.49 3.80 3.90 6.20 6.76 6.87
66 0 0 0 2.67 3.07 3.03 4.71 5.41 5.22
76 0 0 0 1.86 2.53 2.17 3.25 4.44 3.75
86 0 0 0 1.00 2.12 1.74 1.73 3.68 2.99




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0 0 0 2.93 3.28 3.38 5.29 5.92 6.03
66 0 0 0 2.12 2.51 2.48 3.80 4.48 4.37
76 0 0 0 1.51 2.00 1.73 2.67 3.53 3.00
86 0 0 0 0.78 1.60 1.48 1.35 2.76 2.55




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 0 0 0 4.41 4.41 4.41 8.33 8.33 8.33
66 0 0 0 4.41 4.41 4.41 8.33 8.33 8.33
76 0 0 0 4.41 4.41 4.41 8.33 8.33 8.33
86 0 0 0 4.41 4.41 4.41 8.33 8.33 8.33
Source : Author’s calculations, as described in text. The calculations assume a premium of
$100,000. ‘‘Couples ’’ refers to a joint-and-survivor annuity for a couple with the same age and
a symmetric 2/3 survivor beneﬁt. The entries are the percentage change in the money’s worth
based on the benchmarks described in Table 4.2.
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more generous. This relative generosity of the two policy interventions is illustrated
by comparing Tables 4.3 and Table 4.4, where the latter presents the eﬀects of the tax-
credit policy on the MW of $100,000 non-qualiﬁed annuity policies. For qualiﬁed
annuities (assuming the annuity income is below the cap), the eﬀect of the tax-credit is
straightforward. For an individual facing no taxes, a 5% subsidy on annuities would
increase MW by 5%. The percentage increase in the MW for an individual who faces
a positive marginal tax rate is slightly higher since the after-tax value of one dollar
inside the account is less than a dollar. For example, for an individual in the 15% tax
bracket buying an actuarially fair annuity the MW would increase from 0.85/0.85
(the after-tax present value of annuitizing $1/the after-tax value of $1 withdrawn
from a qualiﬁed account) to 0.90/0.85, which is a 5.88% increase in the MW.
5 Using Annuity Equivalent Wealth to Evaluate Policy Interventions
5.1 Methodology
The preceding section indicates that tax incentives can increase the monetary value
of annuitization. We now use an ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’ (AEW) framework
Table 4.4. Percent Change in Money’s Worth Ratios Under Tax-Credit Proposal
($100K Premium)




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 4.25 4.64 4.81 4.65 5.07 5.20 4.96 5.40 5.49
66 3.28 3.77 3.80 3.56 4.09 4.04 3.77 4.33 4.22
76 2.30 3.15 2.76 2.48 3.38 2.90 2.60 3.55 3.00
86 1.27 2.68 2.23 1.33 2.83 2.32 1.38 2.94 2.39




Age Male Female Couples Male Female Couples Male Female Couples
56 3.48 3.92 4.11 3.90 4.37 4.51 4.23 4.73 4.82
66 2.55 3.03 3.07 2.82 3.34 3.31 3.03 3.59 3.49
76 1.86 2.45 2.19 2.01 2.67 2.31 2.13 2.83 2.40
86 0.98 2.01 1.90 1.03 2.13 1.97 1.07 2.21 2.03
Source : Author’s calculations, as described in text. The calculations assume a premium of
$100,000. ‘‘Couples’’ refers to a joint-and-survivor annuity for a couple with the same age and
a symmetric 2/3 survivor beneﬁt. The entries are the percentage change in the money’s worth
based on the benchmarks described in Table 4.2.
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to explore the extent to which these price decreases encourage annuitization – in
eﬀect, to estimate of the price elasticity of annuitization. The AEW literature typi-
cally uses dynamic programming techniques with speciﬁc household preferences to
compute a monetary value a household would place on annuitizing its entire wealth
at actuarially fair rates and at a speciﬁed age. (See, e.g., Mitchell et al. (1999) for
details.)
More recently, Dushi and Webb (2004) explored the optimal timing of annuitiz-
ation by measuring the value of annuitizing any amount of wealth at any time using
loosely calibrated market prices. While we abstract from timing issues by assuming
the annuitization occurs at age 65, our approach allows households’ full ﬂexibility in
their extent of annuitization, and we use actual market prices. To measure the eﬀect
of various policies towards annuitization, we compare the optimal levels of annuitiz-
ation with and without the policies in place for a distribution of households.
The ‘‘annuity puzzle ’’ discussed in Section 2 recommends caution in interpreting
the annuitization patterns predicted by the AEW framework. Indeed, our estimates
of annuitization levels reﬂect this puzzle : we ‘‘predict ’’ signiﬁcantly higher annuitiz-
ation levels than are observed in practice. The usefulness of our estimates lies in the
observation that the AEW framework can be a reasonable guide to changes in
annuitization patterns even when it over-estimates annuitization levels (viz the dis-
cussion in Section 2 and Appendix B).
Our algorithm, discussed in more detail in Appendix A, uses standard household
preferences and stochastic mortality to compute the lifetime expected utility,V(W0,A0),
a household anticipates from a given level of (un-annuitized) initial wealth and for a
given annuity income stream. For a couple without access to private annuity markets,
A0 is the annuity income stream provided by the combination of their Social Security
(SS) and deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pensions. Couples with access to annuity markets can
use some of their wealth W0 to purchase additional annuities, giving them a lower
wealth Wk0 and a larger annuity stream Ak0. Diﬀerent amounts of annuity purchases
will give them diﬀerent (Wk0, Ak0) combinations, and hence diﬀerent lifetime utilities
V(Wk0, Ak0). For computational ease, we assume that annuity markets oﬀer a single
type of annuity product, so that there is a one-to-one mapping from annuitization
spendingW0xWk0 to the net annuity stream Ak0. Our algorithm maximizes V(Wk0, Ak0)
with respect to annuitization spending, thus yielding an optimal amount of annuiti-
zation and a lifetime utility V* for the household with access to this annuity product.
Our ‘‘AEW’’ then solves :
V(AEW W0,A0)=V*: (5:1)
Equation (5.1) implicitly deﬁnes the annuity equivalent wealth as the factor by
which initial un-annuitized wealth would need to be increased to compensate the
household for removing its access to existing annuity markets. Note that in this for-
mulation, AEW is never less than 1.
The algorithm sketched above is slightly complicated by the presence of two
types of wealth – qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed – for a typical retired household (viz
Table 3.1). We surmount this complication with two assumptions. First, we assume
that households use a stacking rule : they annuitize all of their qualiﬁed wealth before
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annuitizing any of their non-qualiﬁed wealth. Qualitatively, the stacking rule seems
like a reasonable rule of thumb, since qualiﬁed wealth is presumably wealth that
households have pre-designated for funding retirement. The evidence appears to
corroborate this : Reichenstein (2002) reports that only 2% of individuals who pur-
chase non-qualiﬁed deferred annuities ultimately annuitize their balances. In con-
trast, Johnson et al. (2004) report that a larger 10% of individuals with DC plans
directly annuitized their assets, and Brown and Warshawsky’s (2000) report indicat-
ing that only 25% of DC plans oﬀered the option to directly annuitize suggests that
this may under-estimate ultimate annuitization. However, we emphasize that we
impose the stacking rule rather than solving the substantially more diﬃcult dynamic
programming problem which would allow individuals the optimal choice of which
type of wealth to annuitize. Second, we ‘‘ tax’’ any un-annuitized qualiﬁed wealth
at the household’s average tax rate, since households can only consume untaxed
portions of any withdrawals.
We start with a collection of 40 households (described below) calibrated to capture
the distribution of retired 65 year-old married U.S. households. We consider
inﬂation-protected joint and symmetric 2/3 survivor policies oﬀered by Vanguard as
the unique annuitization option available to these households. (We consider similar
nominal policies separately.)
To evaluate the eﬀects of a given annuitization-subsidy policy intervention, we
solve for each household’s optimal amount of annuitized wealth, using the algorithm
above, with and without the policy intervention. Comparing annuitization levels
in these two regimes gives our estimate of the policy’s eﬀect on the annuitization
decisions of each household. This procedure eﬀectively amounts to employing AEW
techniques to compute annuitization elasticities.
We discussed much of the data required for these calculations – e.g., the mortality
tables and the term structures of interest and inﬂation rates – in Section 4.14 For a
couple on their 65th birthday, we use an annual payout of $5757.76 and $8108.73 per
$100,000 annuitized for inﬂation protected and nominal annuities, respectively. The
remaining inputs consist of preference parameters, tax rates, the size and structure
of pre-existing annuities, and the wealth proﬁles of retired households. We consider
these in turn.
Preference parameters : We make standard preference assumptions (see e.g., Brown
(2001) or Mitchell et al. (1999)) : constant relative risk aversion, additively separable
across ages and household members, with discounting of future utility and with
consumption complementarities for households with two surviving members. We use
a relative risk aversion parameter of 1.5, a ‘‘ joint consumption factor ’’ of 0.6245
(so that 62.45 cents of each dollar are consumed by both members as in Brown, 2001),
and a 3% subjective discount rate.
14 The SSA Publication 120 (Bell and Miller, 2005) used in Section 4 only contains mortality rates for the
1940 and 1950 cohorts but we consider households born in 1941 (i.e., who are turning 65 in 2006). To
arrive at 1941 mortality rate estimates we linearly interpolate mortality rates from the 1940 and 1950
cohorts.
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Tax rates : We compute approximate tax rates using the National Bureau of
Economics Research’s TAXSIM calculator for each of the 40 households (described
below). Each household has DB wealth, DC wealth, Social Security wealth, and
‘‘other’’ wealth. For our tax computations, we assume each couple ﬁles jointly, has
no dependent children, no wages, no dividends, and no special deductions. We take
other property income to be 5% of ‘‘other ’’ wealth. We assume that taxable pension
income is given by 7.5% of pension plus IRA wealth, and that gross Social Security
income is given by 7.5% of Social Security wealth. We restrict attention to Federal
taxes only by using New Hampshire as the state of residence.
Pre-existing annuities : We treat both Social Security and DB pensions as pre-
existing real annuities with 2/3 joint and survivor beneﬁts. The 2/3 survivor beneﬁt is
the ratio of the Social Security beneﬁts for a surviving spouse to the Social Security
beneﬁts for a couple with one worker with a substantially larger earnings history than
the other (e.g., a one earner household).
Households : In constructing a distribution of households, our goal is to consider
the wealth distribution of a cohort at the beginning of retirement. We start
with the distribution reported by Dushi and Webb (2004) that is summarized in
Table 3.1.15 To capture heterogeneity within deciles in the levels of pre-annuitized
wealth levels and the breakdown of wealth into qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed
accounts, we construct four representative households for each decile. Each rep-
resentative of the decile has the same amount of total wealth (equal to the average
total wealth for the decile) but a diﬀerent composition of wealth. One type of
representative from each decile does not have a deﬁned beneﬁt pension so it is
deﬁned as having zero DB pension wealth. However, we allocate 80 percent of the
decile’s overall IRA and DC pension wealth to these couples. The relative weight
on this household type (i.e., the fraction of households of this type within the
decile) is the fraction of households in the decile that do not report having a
DB pension. The other three representative household classes are dubbed ‘‘ low
DB,’’ ‘‘average DB,’’ and ‘‘high DB’’ households, with relative weights 1:2:1.
We compute the DB wealth of the three classes by ﬁrst distributing all DB wealth
for the decile equally across the DB households, and then shifting 50% of the
‘‘ low DB’’ households’ DB wealth to the ‘‘high DB’’ households. In addition, we
allocate each of the DB households a proportional share of the 20 percent of the
decile’s total IRA and DC pension wealth.16 We adjust non-pension ﬁnancial
wealth for each representative to ensure that each has total wealth equal to the
decile average.
15 Dushi and Webb imputed DB and SS wealth from incomes reported in the HRS using a ﬁxed rate of
interest and inﬂation. In our calculations, we treated total reported DB and SS wealth as the present
value of the after-tax income stream they provide, discounted by the after tax real interest rate for each
household. This allows us to treat the income stream provided by DB and SS wealth as untaxed in our
AEW routine. This modiﬁcation, together with updates to 2006 prices explains the discrepancy between
the wealth levels of these 40 households and the households described in Table 3.1.
16 In a few cases in the bottom decile, this algorithm leads to negative ﬁnancial assets. In these cases, we
constrain ﬁnancial assets to be zero and adjust the DB pension balance accordingly, assigning the
residual DB wealth to the households who would otherwise be assigned no DB wealth. This ‘‘ﬁx’’ is of
quantitatively minor importance.
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5.2 Results on Changes in Annuitization and AEWs
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize our central ﬁndings for the eﬀects of the Lifetime
PAY bill and our proposed tax-credit policy, respectively, using inﬂation-protected
annuities. In both tables, we present results averaged across the four classes of
Table 5.1. Estimated Change in AEW and Annuitized Wealth Induced by


























1 208648.98 81.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
2 354008.43 76.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
3 470566.48 73.04 0.66 0.66 0.00 1.0001 1.0001
4 557638.95 67.00 2.10 2.10 0.00 1.0004 1.0004
5 662614.72 66.74 0.11 1.88 1.78 1.0007 1.0014
6 780707.92 62.92 1.19 6.47 5.28 1.0028 1.0062
7 912382.62 55.86 6.04 16.82 10.77 1.0101 1.0239
8 1088085.41 49.62 10.73 26.21 15.48 1.0185 1.0469
9 1389605.96 48.99 15.91 23.30 7.39 1.0341 1.0515
10 2541823.94 31.11 39.63 43.03 3.39 1.0544 1.0823
Overall 896608.34 51.45 15.89 21.57 5.67 1.0243 1.0401
Deciles 1–9 713806.61 59.50 6.50 13.08 6.58 1.0124 1.0234
Source : Authors’ calculations, as described in text. AEW refers to ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’.
Table 5.2. Estimated Change in AEW and Annuitized Wealth Induced by


























1 208648.98 81.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
2 354008.43 76.36 0.00 3.23 3.23 1.0000 1.0009
3 470566.48 73.04 0.66 4.43 3.77 1.0001 1.0029
4 557638.95 67.00 2.10 7.50 5.40 1.0004 1.0056
5 662614.72 66.74 0.11 5.94 5.83 1.0007 1.0036
6 780707.92 62.92 1.19 7.65 6.45 1.0028 1.0079
7 912382.62 55.86 6.04 16.14 10.10 1.0101 1.0198
8 1088085.41 49.62 10.73 22.76 12.03 1.0185 1.0364
9 1389605.96 48.99 15.91 23.94 8.03 1.0341 1.0521
10 2541823.94 31.11 39.63 42.40 2.77 1.0544 1.0745
Overall 896608.34 51.45 15.89 22.07 6.17 1.0243 1.0371
Deciles 1–9 713806.61 59.50 6.50 14.02 7.52 1.0124 1.0223
Source : Authors’ calculations as described in text. AEW refers to ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’.
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household within each decile of the population described above. The last two rows
present overall or average eﬀects for the entire population and for the subset of the
population below the 10th wealth decile, respectively. We present results without
the top wealth decile because these households may have bequest motives so that
the AEW framework may be less well suited their decisions. Column 4 of both tables
reports our estimates of the optimal fraction of wealth voluntarily annuitized in
the absence of any policy intervention, and Column 5 contains our estimates of the
optimal fractions voluntarily annuitized in the presence of the policy interventions.
The next to last row of Column 4 of these tables indicates our estimate that 15.81%
of total retirement wealth (6.50% within the ﬁrst 9 deciles) would be optimally pre-
annutized, higher than observed annuitization levels in the HRS (Poterba et al.,
2003), consistent with the ‘‘annuity puzzle ’’ described above. Our annuity puzzle
looks even bigger when we use nominal instead of real annuities in our calculations.
Our estimates of changes in the percent of wealth annuitized are reported in
Column 6 of the tables. Table 5.1 suggests that the Lifetime PAY bill will increase
overall annuitization by 5.67% (6.58% below the 10th decile), an increase of ap-
proximately $51,000 of annuitized wealth per household, with the largest percentage
increases occurring in the 7th and 8th wealth deciles. Table 5.2 indicates that the
tax-credit policy will increase overall annuitization by 6.17% (7.71% below the
10th decile), or about $55,000 per household, with the greatest percentage increases
occurring in the same deciles. We obtain similar estimates when we use nominal
instead of inﬂation-protected annuities.
Columns 7 and 8 of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide our estimates of the AEW with
and without the policy proposals. Since the proposals eﬀectively reduce the load on
annuities, they increase the value of having access to these markets, resulting in a
higher AEW. For example, the Lifetime PAY proposal increases the AEW for the
eighth decile from 1.019 to 1.047. The proposal is thus equivalent to a 2.8% increase
in these households’ (non pre-annuitized) wealth.
Table 5.1 again conﬁrms what we saw in Section 4: the Lifetime PAY bill is
unlikely to have substantial eﬀects in encouraging annuitization among low-wealth
households. Column 6 indicates that the annuitization patterns of households in the
ﬁrst four deciles are unaﬀected by the policy change, and Columns 7 and 8 indicate
that their AEW’s are unchanged. This simply reﬂects these households facing
marginal tax rates of zero. The tax-credit policy is better targeted towards increasing
annuitization among the lower wealth deciles, although even this policy may have
no eﬀect for the poorest retired families, whose wealth is mostly pre-annuitized.
The wealth and pre-annuitization patterns in the populations we constructed from
HRS data are reasonable representations of the year 2000 age 65 cohort. To explore
the consequences of the trend away from DB wealth and toward DC wealth, we
generated a ﬁctional ‘‘higher DC-wealth’’ population by converting 50% of the DB
wealth of each of the 40 households in our baseline population to DC wealth.
Table 5.3 reports our results on the eﬀectiveness of the Lifetime PAY bill for this
population. The estimates in Column 6 indicate that this policy would increase
annuitization by 6.10% of retirement wealth, or an average of about $55,000 per
household, modestly larger than our previous estimate. The estimates in Table 5.3
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diﬀer substantially from Table 5.1 in that they indicate substantially higher baseline
(pre-policy) levels of voluntary annuitization – about 27% on average. This reﬂects
the increased importance of voluntary annuitization for households with less pre-
annuitized wealth. Estimates for the tax-credit policy show a similar pattern, so we do
not present a separate table. We estimate this policy would increase annuitization by
about 7.95% on average, or about $71,000 per household.
While our estimates of changes in annuitization levels are best-guess baseline esti-
mates, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding these estimates.17 In particular,
they rely on the validity of the AEW framework predicting changes in annuitization
patterns in spite of the annuity puzzle, but we feel these predictions are valid under
reasonable preference assumptions. As a check on our parameterization of the AEW
framework, we calculate the elasticity of demand for annuities implied by the
dynamic programming exercise. We compare total predicted annuity demand for our
hypothetical distribution of households at market annuity prices with total predicted
demand if insurance loads on annuities were one percent lower. This yielded a ‘‘ load’’
elasticity of demand of approximately 1.25 for nominal annuities and 3 for inﬂation-
protected annuities. Not surprisingly, given our results that suggest that the policies
Table 5.3. Estimated Change in AEW and Annuitized Wealth Induced by Lifetime


























1 208648.98 81.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
2 354008.43 71.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.0000
3 470566.48 63.93 0.66 0.66 0.00 1.0001 1.0001
4 557638.95 59.11 2.14 2.14 0.00 1.0004 1.0004
5 662614.72 55.64 1.58 3.36 1.78 1.0018 1.0025
6 780707.92 51.26 1.19 11.38 10.18 1.0069 1.0113
7 912382.62 44.19 9.62 28.92 19.30 1.0191 1.0401
8 1088085.41 38.91 15.43 34.47 19.04 1.0275 1.0668
9 1389605.96 36.62 28.03 34.22 6.19 1.0651 1.0931
10 2541823.94 22.29 49.58 49.03 x0.55 1.0771 1.1072
Overall 896608.34 41.56 21.64 27.74 6.10 1.0380 1.0582
Deciles 1–9 713806.61 49.18 10.58 19.31 8.73 1.0225 1.0388
Source : Authors’ calculations as described in text. AEW refers to ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’.
‘‘Extra DC wealth’’ considers the thought experiment of converting 12 of each household’s DB pension
wealth to DC pension wealth.
17 Our method does not naturally produce standard errors. We oﬀer the following ‘‘back of the envelope’’
estimate highlighting the substantial uncertainty in our estimate. Brown (2001) estimates that a 1%
increase in the AEW is associated with a 1% increase in the ex-ante probability of annuitizing. Making
the (heroic) assumptions that ex-ante probabilities are perfectly indicative of subsequent behavior, that
annuitizing households fully annuitize, and that Brown’s estimates apply here (a vastly diﬀerent setting),
our estimated changes in AEWs would imply annuitization increases of $8,600 and $4,900 per household
for the Lifetime PAY and tax-credit policies.
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would substantially increase annuity demand, the dynamic programming approach
implies that annuity demand is price elastic.
5.3 Revenue Costs
Our results suggest that both policies would encourage annuitization, but it is im-
portant to calculate the revenue costs of these policies. Fixing attention on the age-65
cohort, we focus on the steady-state (per cohort) costs associated with implementing
these policies. These costs result from the lower tax rates on annuity income after
either policy is implemented. Some of this is the ‘‘windfall ’’ cost of subsidizing an-
nuitization that would have taken place anyway.18
Our revenue cost estimates are designed to complement the increased annuitization
estimates in Column 6 of Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. For each household, we start with a
‘‘baseline ’’ percentage of voluntarily annuitized wealth; we take a range of baselines
from a low-end of zero to a high-end taken from the third column of Tables 5.1, 5.2,
and 5.3. To each baseline, we then add the sixth-column estimates of the percentage
increase in annuitization to obtain a range of estimates for the overall post-policy
percentage annuitized for each household. Next, we compute the after-tax real
income stream provided by the low-end and high-end post-policy and baseline
annuitization levels. Finally, we compute the present discounted value of these after-
tax income streams, using the pre-tax real interest rate. The diﬀerence between the
baseline and the post-policy present values for the low-end and high-end baselines are
our low-end and high-end estimates of the revenue cost of the passage of the bill for a
household.
Table 5.4 summarizes our revenue cost estimates for the annuitization levels from
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. They suggest that the policies are likely to be cost-eﬀective in the
steady-state, with the Lifetime PAY bill (respectively, the tax-credit bill) estimated to
cost between about $2,100 and $6,400 per household, or between about 4 and 12
cents per dollar of additional annuitization (respectively, between about $2,000 and
$5,500 per household or 3.5 and 10 cents per additional dollar). Similar calculations
using nominal annuities raised the lower bound estimates modestly, and approxi-
mately doubled the upper bound estimates to about 24 and 18 cents per the dollar for
the Lifetime PAY and tax-credit bills, respectively.
Future cohorts will have less of their wealth in deﬁned beneﬁt plans, and therefore
will presumably voluntarily annuitize more wealth even without policy interventions.
To get a feel for how much this might increase revenue costs, we do analogous cal-
culations using the hypothetical ‘‘extra DC wealth’’ population used in constructing
Table 5.3. Table 5.4 also reports these results. It indicates that higher DC balances
would indeed increase the costs associated with the policy but that the costs would
still remain relatively modest, with upper bounds of about $8,600 and $7,900 per
18 Our method eﬀectively assumes that, absent the policy subsidy, each household’s annuitization decision
is revenue neutral, in present value terms, for the Federal government. There may be additional revenue
consequences insofar as taxes on withdrawals from qualiﬁed accounts and on interest income (and, in
principle, estate taxes) on un-annuitized wealth may diﬀer from the taxes on annuity income prior to the
policy intervention.
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Table 5.4. Estimated Steady-State Revenue Costs of Policy Interventions
Baseline DC Wealth Levels Extra DC Wealth

















Lower Bound $2106.28 0.0414 $1987.25 0.0359 $2324.85 0.0425 $2810.28 0.0394
Upper Bound $6427.43 0.1264 $5461.92 0.0987 $8583.81 0.1570 $7921.94 0.1112
Midpoint $4266.86 0.0839 $3724.59 0.0673 $5454.33 0.0975 $5366.11 0.0753
Source : Authors’ calculations, as described in text.The left panel reports estimates of the revenue cost of introducing the Lifetime PAY and tax-credit
policies on the each cohort as they reach age 65 and annuitize. These are computed by comparing the diﬀerence in the present discounted value of a ﬁxed
annuity stream with and without the policies. The lower-bound estimates assume zero annuitization prior to the policy implementation, while the upper-
bound estimates assume baseline annuitization levels as in the third column of Tables 5.1 and 5.2. the 6th column of Table 5.1 or 5.2. The right panel

































household or about 16 cents and 11 cents per dollar of additional annuitization for
the Lifetime PAY policy and tax-credit policies, respectively.
In addition to these steady-state costs, implementing these proposals may create
transition costs if older cohorts who have already made their annuitization decisions
beneﬁt from the policy change without responding to the policies. One way to avoid
these transition costs would be to restrict the policies to transactions that occur after
the enactment of the legislation. Even without such a restriction, the windfall gains
from these older cohorts beneﬁting from the policy are likely to be small given the
modest levels of actual voluntary annuitization.
6 Conclusions: Policy Options for Encouraging Annuitization
Annuitization decisions of retirees promise to be a growing public policy concern as
the baby boom generation retires, life expectancy continues to grow, and the retire-
ment planning landscape continues to shift from traditional pension plans to retire-
ment plans based on personal accounts. The combination of the demographic trends
and the change in pension institutions is headed for a confrontation with what
economists refer to as the annuity puzzle : households seem reluctant to annuitize
their assets voluntarily through private insurance markets, and these markets are
much thinner than economic theory predicts they ought to be. While there are many
potential causes for the annuity puzzle, public policy can play a role in combating the
potential underutilization of these markets.
Our qualitative analysis of the rationales for policy interventions in annuity
markets suggests a number of desirable policy features. First, there are economic
reasons (apart from potential distributional concerns) for policies to target annuitiz-
ation incentives towards individuals with low to moderate wealth. The well docu-
mented correlation between wealth and longevity implies that such targeted
interventions are more eﬀective at addressing adverse selection problems and may
therefore be magniﬁed via a ‘‘ life-spiral. ’’ Additionally, there is a ‘‘moral hazard’’
argument for such targeting: under-annuitization among low-wealth individuals is
potentially more costly to a government which serves as an ‘‘ insurer of last resort ’’
for individuals who exhaust their own resources in old age.
Second, our analysis recommends policies designed to encourage annuitization at
earlier ages, when informational asymmetries regarding longevity are likely to be
less acute. Third, we observe that an important consideration in designing policy
interventions is the ﬁscal cost. In particular, it may be desirable to design a policy
which incentivizes new annuitization while minimizing or avoiding the transition
costs associated with incidental beneﬁts provided to households who have already
annuitized.
We speciﬁcally analyze two possible policy interventions: a tax-exemption based
intervention and a refundable tax-credit based intervention. Both policies we consider
impose a cap on total annual tax beneﬁts from annuity income. These caps go some
way towards targeting beneﬁts at smaller policies purchased by lower-wealth house-
holds. Furthermore, these caps actively encourage earlier annuitization among
individuals who would exceed the cap were they to annuitize at old age.
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Our quantitative analysis of these two policy interventions implies that tax-
based proposals could substantially reduce the insurance loads that contribute to
households’ reluctance to annuitize and could have a substantial eﬀect on the
amount of voluntary annuitization in the economy. Our benchmark estimates
suggest that 65-year old couples would respond to the policies by increasing the
amount of wealth that they annuitize by an average of roughly $50,000. The
revenue consequences of these proposals are a concern but, mainly due to the low
level of initial annuitization, these proposals appear to have fairly modest revenue
costs for the government. We estimate the present value of the steady-state rev-
enue costs to be on the order of 10 cents per additional dollar of annuitized
wealth.
While our estimates indicate that the two policies are likely to have similar eﬀects
on the overall level of annuitization, we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the distri-
bution of induced increases in annuitization across households of diﬀerent wealth.
Neither policy is particularly eﬀective at encouraging annuitization among the lowest
wealth deciles, but the gains from the tax-credit intervention are signiﬁcantly better
targeted towards households with moderate wealth, as compared with the tax-
exemption policy whose beneﬁts are disproportionately concentrated in the highest
wealth deciles. While we cannot estimate of the magnitude of ‘‘ life-spiral ’’ and
‘‘moral-hazard’’ reduction beneﬁts of the policy interventions, these considerations
clearly recommend the tax credit policy vis-a`-vis the tax exemption policy we
consider.
Insofar as it would be politically inexpedient to provide tax beneﬁts to income from
newly purchased annuities without providing the same beneﬁts to existing annuity
streams, neither of the two policies addresses concerns about transition costs.
However, it would be possible to provide incentives which are analytically equivalent
to those of the tax credit policy via a direct subsidy to new annuity purchases. Such a
policy would signiﬁcantly front-load the revenue costs, however.
Our quantitative analysis is essentially based on the observation that commonly
employed ‘‘Annuity Equivalent Wealth’’ techniques can be adapted to provide price
elasticity of annuitization estimates. That these techniques have been shown to over-
predict empirically observed annuitization levels raises the concern that they may also
provide biased elasticity estimates. The literature has not provided precise empirical
estimates of how annuitization responds to price incentives, so we cannot empirically
corroborate our estimates. The overprediction of annuitization levels provided by
this framework should not be taken to indicate that our elasticity estimates will
necessarily be biased in any particular direction, however. Indeed, elasticity estimates
such as ours can be unbiased even when they signiﬁcantly overestimate annuitization
levels. Furthermore, our methodology omits some important features of the policy
that could lead to even larger responses than we predict. First, as annuity markets
thicken, one would expect that the private market pricing would improve, especially
if adverse selection problems become less severe in these markets. Second, our esti-
mates do not include any ‘‘ informational responses’’ to the policy by which a
government policy to encourage a behavior plays the role of increasing public
awareness of the wisdom of the behavior. Incorporating these eﬀects to reﬁne
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estimates of the proposals’ eﬀects would be a useful but challenging area for further
research.
A broader research agenda could explore other mechanisms by which the govern-
ment might improve annuity markets. Ameriks (1999) ﬁnds that annuitization rates
are quite high for TIAA-CREF participants, typically workers in the education and
research sectors. Insofar as these annuitization rates result in part from the substan-
tial ﬁnancial education about coupling retirement savings with annuitization that
TIAA-CREF has traditionally provided, this suggests that ﬁnancial education and
the design of plan rules could also increase annuitization. Of course, TIAA-CREF
clients may not be representative of the overall population.
One strategy would focus on ﬁnancial education for retirement planning. Without
entering the business of oﬀering detailed ﬁnancial advice, the government could
potentially provide some general information about retirement options, including
the need for savings and the advantages and disadvantages of annuitization. This
information could be modeled on the annual statements sent annually to American
workers by the Social Security Administration (SSA), statements which explain fairly
complicated concepts about annuitization through Social Security.
In terms of redesigning rules, one small step for strengthening the link between
retirement savings and annuity markets would be to modify the rules for 401(k) and
similar plans to require that life annuities be included as a withdrawal option from
these plans. Brown and Warshawsky (2000) report that, in 1997, only 27 percent of
401(k) plan participants had the option of purchasing a life annuity without going
through a two-step process of withdrawing the funds from the retirement account
and rolling them over into an annuity product. Requiring life annuities as a with-
drawal option would streamline the annuitization process for many as well as by
signaling that the government believes that annuitization is important for retirees.
The link between saving and annuitizing through these plans could be made even
more explicit in many ways. Following on the behavioral economics ﬁndings that
the ‘‘default ’’ option matters for savings choices through retirement savings plans
(Choi et al., 2004), one could also design these plans such that the default option is
that the savings is annuitized at a speciﬁc age in the future. Changing the default
option would not legally bind anyone to annuitize wealth but would require
employees to take an action to avoid annuitization rather than take action to
annuitize.
A more stringent approach to linking saving with annuitization would be to rede-
sign 401(k) plans to have two tiers of saving. One tier would work as contributions
and withdrawals work under current rules. The other tier would commit the savings
to be used as a life annuity. Inducing people to use the second tier could be achieved
by oﬀering diﬀerentially larger tax incentives for the second tier of savings relative
to the ﬁrst tier.19
19 Alternatively, the government could mandate that some fraction of 401(k) savings be invested in the
second tier. Such mandates could inadvertently decrease the total amount of savings through such plans.
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Appendix A – Formalities of the AEW Calculations
This appendix oﬀers a brief and technical summary of the AEW computation pro-
cedure described loosely in Section 5. We break our discussion into three sections.
The ﬁrst describes the preferences of a household and uses them to derive its indirect
utility function V(W0, A) over initial wealth and annuity payment streams. The se-
cond section describes how we use this function to derive the AEW of access to a
given annuity product. The ﬁnal section describes how we actually compute the
function V(W0, A).
Throughout this appendix, we assume that all values are real values (i.e., in current
dollars) unless we speciﬁcally note otherwise.
(i) Preferences








m, t f ); tm, t f )),
(A:1)
where tm and tf are the death age of the male and the female, respectively; P(tm, tf)
gives the probability that the male and female will die at ages tm and tf, respectively;
where d=1.03 reﬂects our assumption that households discount the future by 3% per
year; and where
ut(c; t








if t<min {tm, t f}
c1xc
1xc





In (A.2), c=1.5 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and n=.625 measures
consumption complementarities if both the husband and wife are living.
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The household maximizes its utility over feasible consumption plans of the form:
C={(c65(tm, t f ), . . . , c100(tm, t f )}65ftmf101, 65ft f 101, (A:3)
where the term ct(t
m, tf) gives the amount of assets the household plans to consume at
age t, if the male and female die at tm and tf, respectively. To capture the fact that the
households do not know death ages in advance, we need to impose a feasibility
constraint :
ct(t
m, t f )=ct(t0m, t0 f ) if
tfmin {tm, t f, t0m, t0 f} or
tm=t0mft<min {t f, t0 f} or





Resource constraints also restrict feasible consumptions. Fixing an initial wealth level
W0 and an annuity stream A={(A65B , …, A100B ), A65O , …, A100O }, with the time t annuity
payment given by
At(t
m, t f )=
ABt if t<min {t
m, t f}
AOt if min {t






m, t f )fWt(tm, t f ), (A:6)
where Wt(t
m, tf) is deﬁned recursively by W64(t
m, tf)=W0 and, for 65ftf100, by:
Wt(t
m, t f )=
At(t





where rt is the real (annual) after-tax interest rate faced by the household between
ages (t – 1) and t. Expression (A.6) reﬂects our assumption that households cannot
borrow against (or sell) their future annuity income. (A.7) reﬂects our (purely tech-
nical) assumption that all wealth is lost once both members of the household have
died.
For a given initial wealth an annuity stream, then, the feasible set C(W0, A) of
consumption proﬁles is the set of set of consumption proﬁles C satisfying (A.4) and
(A.6) for all 65ftf100 and for all 65ftmf101 and 65ftff101.
Finally, we can formally deﬁne the lifetime expected utility of a household as a





We assume that there is a single annuity product available for purchase. It is linearly
priced: for each $1 premium, it provides a stream of pre-tax life-contingent payments
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at(t
m, tf). We separately consider two types of annuity, nominal and inﬂation pro-
tected annuities. Nominal annuities pay:
at(t
m, t f )=
a=pt if t<min {t
m, t f}
2
3a=pt if min {t






where pt is the ratio of the price levels at age t and age 64. Inﬂation protected
annuities pay:
at(t
m, t f )=
a if t<min {tm, t f}
2
3a if min {t




(A.9) and (A.10) are both joint and 2/3 survivor annuities. Based on Vanguard’s
pricing, as described in the text, we take a=$8108.73 in (A.9) and a=$5757.76 in
(A.10).
Now consider a household with marginal tax rate k, an average tax rate k, an
amount WQ of qualiﬁed wealth and an amount W0 –W
Q of non-qualiﬁed wealth
(with no inside buildup). We use this to compute the real after-tax annuity income
function At*(B, t
m, tf ).At*(B, t
m, tf ) gives the size of the annuity payment at year t for
each possible pair of death times for the couple as a function of the amount B
the household spends on an annuity. As described in the text, we assume a ‘‘stacking
rule : ’’ individuals ﬁrst annuitize their qualiﬁed wealth. We separately treat three
cases : the baseline case with no policy intervention, the Lifetime Pay policy inter-
vention and the tax-credit policy intervention (viz Section 4.4.2). Following IRS
guidelines, we take the de jure life expectancy of a couple to be 22 years, and deﬁne
the real exclusion amount via:
Et(B)=




where we have used the stacking rule and the zero exclusion for qualiﬁed annuities.
Case 1: Baseline tax treatment
At*(B, t
m, t f )=Et(B)+(1xk)(Bat(tm, t f )xEt(B)): (A:12)
Equation (A.12) reﬂects our simplifying ‘‘refund of extra basis ’’ assumption dis-
cussed in the text (viz Section 4.2.3).
Case 2: Lifetime PAY tax treatment
The Lifetime PAY bill would exempt some annuity income from taxation. Were there
no limits, the exemption would be given by:
Xt(B, t
m, t f )=
0:25Bat(t
m, t f ) if B<WQ
0:25Bat(t
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Equation (A.13) reﬂects the 25% and 50% exemption for qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed
annuity income in the Lifetime PAY bill and our ‘‘stacking rule’’ assumption.
Writing the total exemption, including the $5,000 per living annuitant limit in the
bill, we have:
Xt(B, t
m, t f )=
min { Xt(B, t
m, t f ), 10,000} if t<min {tm, t f}
min { Xt(B, t







Finally, the after-tax annuity income function is given by:
At*
,LP(B, tm, t f )=Et(B)+(1xk)(Bat(tm, t f )xEt)+kXt(B, tm, t f ): (A:15)
Case 3: Tax-credit policy intervention
Ignoring limits, the tax-credit intervention we consider provides a refundable tax
credit equal to:
Rt(B, t
m, t f )=
0:05Bat(t
m, t f ) if B<WQ
0:05Bat(t




Equation (A.16) reﬂects the 5% and 10% credit on qualiﬁed and non-qualiﬁed
annuity income and our ‘‘stacking rule ’’ assumption. Including the $1,000 per live
annuitant maximum tax credit, the refundable tax credit is given by:
Rt(B, t
m, t f )=
min { Rt(B, t
m, t f ), 2,000} if t<min {tm, t f}
min { Rt(B, t







Finally, the after-tax annuity income function is given by:
At*
,S(B, tm, t f )=Et(B)+(1xk)(Bat(tm, t f )xEt)+Rt(B, tm, t f ): (A:18)
Using A*(B) (respectively, A*,LP (B) and A*,S(B)) to denote the entire stream (i.e.,
the stream for any death date pair) of after tax annuity payments received in
exchange for a premium of B under the baseline case (respectively, under the Lifetime
PAY bill and the tax-credit policy) we can now describe the household’s optimal
annuitization decision. Let K(B)=B if B>WQ, and K(B)=B+k(WQxB) otherwise
(to reﬂects our assumption that any qualiﬁed income which is not annuitized is
withdrawn immediately and taxed at the household’s average tax rate). Then, under
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with obvious analogs for the optimal fractions annuitized, avol*
,LP and avol*
,S in the other
two cases. Similarly, we can deﬁne the lifetime utility V* for a household with access




Finally, we implicitly deﬁne the AEW of access to a given type of annuity policy via:
AEW=min {xjV(xW0,A0)oV*} (A:21)
(iii) Computing (A.8)
As the ﬁrst section of this appendix suggests, evaluating the function V(W0, A) is a
non-trivial task. We use standard dynamic program techniques for this. Following
Brown (2001) and others, we write the problem in recursive form (i.e., via a Bellman
equation). In particular, we deﬁne the functions V100
B (W), V100















































































f) gives the male (female) mortality rate at age t (i.e., the
conditional probability that a male (female) who lives until the last day of his (t – 1)st
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F(W) recursively, starting for t=100 by evaluating (A.22), and
then numerically optimizing (A.23) via a grid search. This gives us an approximation
of (A.24). For a better approximation, we use a ﬁner discretization (in practice, grids
with 750 points appear to be suﬃcient for our purposes).
Finally, we solve (A.20) and (A.21) using a search routine that relies on there being
a unique local maximum to that problem; this speeds computation time up signiﬁ-
cantly relative to a grid search routine.
Appendix B – When is it Valid to Use the AEW framework for ‘‘Changes ’’?
This paper’s central estimates hinge on the hope that the AEW framework can
provide a good framework for evaluating changes in annuitization patterns even in
the presence of the ‘‘annuity puzzle ’’ – that is, even when the framework gets the level
of annuitization incorrect. This appendix presents a simple class of circumstances
under which this hope is borne out and estimates of changes on predicted annuitiz-
ation levels are exactly correct even though the predicted levels of annuitization are
too high.
The AEW framework captures the ‘‘value ’’of annuitization. In appendix A,
we focus on the value of having access to an annuity market via the well being of
individuals who choose their optimal quantity a* of annuity purchases. This involves
determining how well oﬀ they would be at any level a of annuitization, and max-
imizing their well being over all possible values of a. In other words, our estimated
levels a* of annuitization maximize some well-being function Z(a). Suppose this well






where k and m are constants.
This model produces an ‘‘estimate’’ of an annuitization level a*, an estimate which
may over-estimate empirically observed levels of annuitization. One cause of this over
estimate may simply be that the value function captured in (A.25) fails to take into
account some decision-relevant ‘‘cost ’’ of annuitization – be it a psychological cost,
an informational cost, or simply a behavioral artifact attributable to a failure to
maximize the ‘‘right ’’ thing. If this cost takes a simple linear form, then individuals





Consequently, they will choose ~a*=a*x bm<a* and there will be an ‘‘annuity
puzzle. ’’
Now consider two policy regimes. Regime s=0 refers to the ‘‘no policy ’’ and
regime s=1 refers to the ‘‘ tax-subsidy policy’’ regime (e.g., under the Lifetime PAY
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for the value function on the basis of which individuals actually make decisions.
Our estimates of the increase in annuitization induced by the policy will therefore









. In other words, in spite of the annuity puzzle, estimated
changes in annuitization rates are a valid guide to actual increases in annuitization
rates.
Clearly, this toy example relies on a number of simplifying assumptions which
are unlikely to hold exactly in practice. These include the assumptions about the
quadratic form of the value function (although this will generically be a good local
approximation; the key piece is the assumption that the local curvature of the value
function is similar in both policy regimes) and the particular cause of the annuity
puzzle (as well as its functional form). Nevertheless, it illustrates that the AEW
framework can provide consistent estimates of changes in annuitization even when
it gets annuitization levels wrong.
Finally, it is worth noting that, at least in this simplistic model, there can be
variability across individuals in the extent of the annuity puzzle (i.e., b can vary
across individuals) without aﬀecting the validity of the ‘‘changes’’ estimate.
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